Tweet
The Poor Bloody Infantry Faces More Friendly Fire?
Alex MassieTuesday, 5th April 2011 "The Spectator" UK.
In opposition Liam Fox boasted he could cut the Ministry of Defence by 25% without there being any impact on "frontline" troops. The confirmation that there will be 17,000 fewer men and women in uniform by this parliament's end mocks that promise. To govern is to choose, for sure, but the scale of these cuts leads one to wonder, again, what kind of capability will be left once they are completed.
For now, the Gurkhas excepted, the infantry has been spared. But there are already indications that its luck, if you can call it that after all the reorganisations of recent years, will run out when the next "tranche" of cuts is announced. Today's editions of the Scotsman and the Herald each publish warnings that entire infantry battalions are at risk. According to Clive Fairweather:
"It looks like six battalions across the whole army are under threat and one or two of those will come from the Royal Regiment for Scotland. Certainly, my contacts and papers I have seen suggest that this might be the case."
"Unfortunately, as the Highlanders and the Argyll and Sutherland battalions are the two most junior, they are most at threat.
"The Highlanders have a particular problem because they will have to be re-based anyway when they are withdrawn from Germany. Of course, they may end up in Leuchars or whichever RAF base is closed down, but they could be an easy target, as could the Argyll and Sutherland battalion down in Canterbury, which I say with regret as one of its honorary colonels."
He went on: "The whole thing seems to be a complete nonsense. Boots on the ground are our best insurance policy and we are still trying to be involved on the world stage, as we can see in Afghanistan and Libya. We will not be able to continue if these cuts go through.
"What we are going to end up with is a Danish-style defence force, not an army."
not an army."
Fairweather, who was second-in-command at the SAS during the Iranian Embassy Siege, may have an interest in these matters and may, for sure, be mistaken or simply launching the first salvo in the campaign to prevent the cuts depleting the infantry still further. Nevertheless, if even a third of what he suggests is planned actually happens then one does wonder what sort of infantry capability will remain.
At present the army has 36 infantry battalions. If a tour of duty overseas lasts six months and the army wishes a 24 month gap between operational tours (down from the current 30 months) then evidently it takes five battalions to support a single battalion's deployment. Granted, that assumes operations may, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, last for years but such assumptions would seem, to this interested amateur anyway, an important part of defence planning.
Perhaps it seems unlikely that we will commit ourselves to these kinds of extended operations in the future. But a few months ago it would have seemed improbable that we'd be deploying the RAF and Royal Navy to Libya. If there's any area of government spending that demands excess capacity, it's surely the armed forces. Yet what kind of capacity - excess or not - will remain once these cuts have been completed? What resources will be available to respond to future crises and unexpected events?
It's not just the army either. This (excellent) Think Defence post demonstrates the impact of even a relatively modest deployment on the resources of a typical, if in this instance hypothetical, RAF squadron. Similarly, when one infantry battalion needs to "borrow" a company from a brother regiment it necessarily creates an impact that ripples down the line, placing additional stresses on men and material as well as hampering that second regiment's own preparations for deployment. There's plenty of robbing Pete to pay Paul.
These concerns, amidst many others, are hardly new. How much "flex" is there in the system at present? Precious little it seems.
There's little space for sentiment in these affairs. Back when he was just the leader of the opposition I recall an interview David Cameron gave to the Dundee Courier much of which was concerned - to Cameron's evident surprise - with the future of the Black Watch. Cameron, as is his wont, was polite and gracious but confirmed his government had no intention of reversing the process which led to the creation of the Royal Regiment of Scotland.
in some respects that made sense. Yet at the time I recalled, and still do, the fact that many of the chaps I was at school with were not joining the "British Army" they were joining the Black Watch or the KOSB or the Royal Scots. The regimental identity and tradition was a large part of the deal and the attraction. Some of that has been lost now and not just in Scotland either.
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, pictured above, may only date from 1881 but the Sutherland component are the chaps who held the Thin Red Line at Balaclava. Losing the thread of history may be thought a sentimental concern that's less important than considerations of the army's capacity but that doesn't mean these sentiments are worthless - not least when the planned to cuts to capability seem less than wholly rational themselves.
http://www.spectator.co.uk/alexmassi...dly-fire.thtml
Alex MassieTuesday, 5th April 2011 "The Spectator" UK.
In opposition Liam Fox boasted he could cut the Ministry of Defence by 25% without there being any impact on "frontline" troops. The confirmation that there will be 17,000 fewer men and women in uniform by this parliament's end mocks that promise. To govern is to choose, for sure, but the scale of these cuts leads one to wonder, again, what kind of capability will be left once they are completed.
For now, the Gurkhas excepted, the infantry has been spared. But there are already indications that its luck, if you can call it that after all the reorganisations of recent years, will run out when the next "tranche" of cuts is announced. Today's editions of the Scotsman and the Herald each publish warnings that entire infantry battalions are at risk. According to Clive Fairweather:
"It looks like six battalions across the whole army are under threat and one or two of those will come from the Royal Regiment for Scotland. Certainly, my contacts and papers I have seen suggest that this might be the case."
"Unfortunately, as the Highlanders and the Argyll and Sutherland battalions are the two most junior, they are most at threat.
"The Highlanders have a particular problem because they will have to be re-based anyway when they are withdrawn from Germany. Of course, they may end up in Leuchars or whichever RAF base is closed down, but they could be an easy target, as could the Argyll and Sutherland battalion down in Canterbury, which I say with regret as one of its honorary colonels."
He went on: "The whole thing seems to be a complete nonsense. Boots on the ground are our best insurance policy and we are still trying to be involved on the world stage, as we can see in Afghanistan and Libya. We will not be able to continue if these cuts go through.
"What we are going to end up with is a Danish-style defence force, not an army."
not an army."
Fairweather, who was second-in-command at the SAS during the Iranian Embassy Siege, may have an interest in these matters and may, for sure, be mistaken or simply launching the first salvo in the campaign to prevent the cuts depleting the infantry still further. Nevertheless, if even a third of what he suggests is planned actually happens then one does wonder what sort of infantry capability will remain.
At present the army has 36 infantry battalions. If a tour of duty overseas lasts six months and the army wishes a 24 month gap between operational tours (down from the current 30 months) then evidently it takes five battalions to support a single battalion's deployment. Granted, that assumes operations may, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, last for years but such assumptions would seem, to this interested amateur anyway, an important part of defence planning.
Perhaps it seems unlikely that we will commit ourselves to these kinds of extended operations in the future. But a few months ago it would have seemed improbable that we'd be deploying the RAF and Royal Navy to Libya. If there's any area of government spending that demands excess capacity, it's surely the armed forces. Yet what kind of capacity - excess or not - will remain once these cuts have been completed? What resources will be available to respond to future crises and unexpected events?
It's not just the army either. This (excellent) Think Defence post demonstrates the impact of even a relatively modest deployment on the resources of a typical, if in this instance hypothetical, RAF squadron. Similarly, when one infantry battalion needs to "borrow" a company from a brother regiment it necessarily creates an impact that ripples down the line, placing additional stresses on men and material as well as hampering that second regiment's own preparations for deployment. There's plenty of robbing Pete to pay Paul.
These concerns, amidst many others, are hardly new. How much "flex" is there in the system at present? Precious little it seems.
There's little space for sentiment in these affairs. Back when he was just the leader of the opposition I recall an interview David Cameron gave to the Dundee Courier much of which was concerned - to Cameron's evident surprise - with the future of the Black Watch. Cameron, as is his wont, was polite and gracious but confirmed his government had no intention of reversing the process which led to the creation of the Royal Regiment of Scotland.
in some respects that made sense. Yet at the time I recalled, and still do, the fact that many of the chaps I was at school with were not joining the "British Army" they were joining the Black Watch or the KOSB or the Royal Scots. The regimental identity and tradition was a large part of the deal and the attraction. Some of that has been lost now and not just in Scotland either.
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, pictured above, may only date from 1881 but the Sutherland component are the chaps who held the Thin Red Line at Balaclava. Losing the thread of history may be thought a sentimental concern that's less important than considerations of the army's capacity but that doesn't mean these sentiments are worthless - not least when the planned to cuts to capability seem less than wholly rational themselves.
http://www.spectator.co.uk/alexmassi...dly-fire.thtml
Comment